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En appliquant une perspective feministe a
I'etude traditionnellement masculine de
rethique, le besoin d'une demarche toute a
fait differente dans le domaine devient tres
evident. Deux theories patriarcales dominent
encore la pensee des moralistes contemporains
- l'utilitarisme, et la theorie de Kant. Les deux
se basent sur des idees abstraites; elles ne par-
viennent pas aintegrer ce que nous ressentons
l'une pour l'autre, avec les contextes sociaux
dans lesquels nous fonctionnons. Dans son
livre influent In A Different Voice, Carol
Gilligan - feministe et educatrice americaine
- fait la distinction entre I'ethique des droits
du male et I'ethique des soins de la femelle.
Dans cet article, Susan Sherwin examine la
perspective de Gilligan en relation avec notre
approche du raisonnement moral.
Ethics, or moral theory, is the field of
study concerned with identifying and
explaining moral obligations. The most
widely-accepted theories all reflect a dis-
tinct male bias. Because they do not
address the moral experience of women
they are not acceptable in their current
form. A new sort of moral theory is neces-
sary, one which offers guidance in the
many difficult cases we all encounter in
which our moral intuitions cannot be
relied upon. Feminist thought offers
promise as a source for developing an
alternative to patriarchal moral theories.
To understand the masculinist bias of
the traditional theories, I will examine the
two major theories that retain a domi-
nant position among contemporary
moral philosophers: Utilitarianism and
Kantianism. In spite of their widely-
discussed differences, they share some
significant similarities. Both take the same
methodological principle as fundamen-
tal - a principle which is disturbing to
women. Both take their task to be evaluat-
ing action according to the most abstract
principle available. They assume that
actions can be judged formally, apart from
the many details of their context, as if the
action could be done equally by any agent.
In its most simplified form, Utilitarianism
tells us always to act in ways that produce
the greatest benefit and least harm.
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Kantian theory tells us to act in accordance
with rules we can will to be universal, and
specifically to refrain from treating per-
sons merely as means or objects. Neither
theory tells us to think about the relation-
ship we have with the person concerned
and our related feelings; rather, both
agree that this would be improper
(although for Utilitarians, it may be of
indirect significance).
Such a purely abstract approach clearly
has some important advantages, for it
stresses the importance of counting equal-
ly the interests of every person. It seeks a
clear and unbiased decision-making
procedure for resolving moral questions,
a goal which seems central to our intui-
tions about justice and fairness. In prac-
tice, however, these theories have done
little to assure women of fair treatment: it
was Kant, after all, who added "Of
course, I exclude women, children and
idiots," in his Principles ofJustice. Nor does
the abstract approach allow room for the
feelings that attach to decision-making. In
directing our moral concerns to the com-
mon humanity of each person, these
theories require us to disregard the special
concern we have for those we care deeply
about. Theories such as these, which view
persons in terms of their most abstract
properties without accounting for their
social relations, promote a world view in
which people are thought of as isolated,
independent, inter-changeable atoms.
Social interaction is seen as the bumping
of one atom against another, and is
treated as an aberration in need of
explanation.
What is missing from this approach is a
sense of recognition and caring for other
persons. Personal and emotional bonds
ought to be recognized as morally signifi-
cant from a moral point of view. Further,
those qualities which are valued in the
standard theories need to be re-inter-
preted to reflect the social context in which
they occur. Autonomy, for example,
should not be equated with independence
and freedom from social responsibility. It
should be seen as a mode of conduct with-
in relationships and within a community.
In her book on moral reasoning, In a
Different Voice, psychologist Carol Gilligan
has identified two different kinds of
reasoning which subjects use when con-
fronted with a moral dilemma. lOne
approach is described as an ethics of rights.
Moral dilemmas are aproached as prob-
lems in logic to be addressed by the most
abstract, general principle available. The
self, and hence any person, is defined
through separation, to be evaluated by
some abstract criterion of perfection.
Within this model, autonomy is of para-
mount value; it is defined in terms of the
individual's separation from, rather than
connection with others. Morality involves
those obligations on the self that limit
one's freedom and aggression, and the
hard questions have to do with the con-
flicts of rights which occur when two iso-
lated person/atoms happen to touch up
against one another.
It is this conception that the Kantian
and Utilitarian moral theories presume.
Both are explicitly impersonal: they regard
persons solely in terms of some abstract
common property (either their sentience
or their rationality). Both reflect a deeply
individualistic world view in which the
major moral problems are viewed as aris-
ing from conflicts of interest between per-
sons presumed to be equal in status,
power, and responsibility.
But Gilligan also identifies a different
approach to moral decision-making, an
ethics ofcare in which one looks at relation-
ships when making moral decisions. Con-
nections among people are perceived as
important. Whether or not there is a con-
tract for reciprocity, moral duties require
us not to hurt others and to exercise care.
Those who appeal to an ethics of care
think in terms of responsibilities rather than
rights in making moral decisions. Moral
dilemmas, viewed as conflicts of responsi-
bilities, require detailed knowledge of the
social context.
Gilligan found that there were clear
gender differences in moral reasoning.
Males tend to appeal to an ethics of rights,
while females employ an ethics of care. As
Virginia Woolf said in A Roolll of Onc's
Own, "It is obvious that the values of
women differ very often from the values
which have been made by the other sex."
She added, "itis the masculine values that
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prevail." The development of moral
theory reflects that ethics has been the
domain of male philosophers: it has
refused to include discussion of an ethics
of care.
Surely it is time for women to reclaim
moral theory. We must consider what sort
of theory we need to account for our moral
intuitions and to give guidance on the
hard cases as we perceive them - those
cases in which we perceive a conflict of
responsibilities. We need a moral theory
that includes the social context, relations,
and loyalties which shape our responsibi-
lities. The theory should acknowledge
duties which derive from emotions, for
love, friendship, shared oppression, and
even hate are all grounds for one's behav-
ing differently towards different persons-
a fact that an ethics of rights is hard press-
ed to explain.
Under an ethics of rights, morality is an
instrument for distancing oneself from
others and limiting the claims others can
make on one. In an ethics of care, differ-
ences between persons are assumed and
our responsibility to each other depends
upon particular features. Dependence
and interdependence are accepted as
features of a connected society. Such
relationships are not always a product of
contract or choice, and in most cases they
are not expected to be permanent; it is
recognized that persons do go through
periods of dependency and those who can
be responsible to them are responsible
whether they choose to be or not. Moral
and social theory should reflect the fact
that persons are not all equal in their mor-
al responsibilities or capacities.
What will such a moral theory say? We
can get some indication by looking at the
alternative values underlying feminist
critiques of existing social patterns.
Common to all feminist writing is a criti-
que of patriarchy, that is, of a society
based on male domination. Contrary to
popular belief, most feminists are not in-
terested in simply reordering the prevail-
ing dominant/subordinate power struc-
ture of society. Human beings are in-
herently social, relationships are part of
the very conception of a person, and
rationality is not defined purely in terms
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of self-interest. Most feminists thinkers
reject the political conception that identi-
fies a "private sphere" in which indi-
viduals act independently according to
their private preference: all persons are
interconnected and there is no such thing
as a purely private act.
From this perspective, collective actions
are primary. Ethics, then, must begin with
a social moral theory. Only then will we be
in a position to think about what the indi-
vidual's personal responsibility might be.
Such a theory will acknowledge our perso-
nal relationships and will allow indi-
viduals to make moral decisons as women
intuitively do, by taking seriously the
bonds of personal concern people have for
others. It will give explicit value to the
virtues of women - those associated with
nurturing and care - and to co-operation
and avoidance of vicious competition
(where having the other person lose is an
essential requirement to satisfaction). The
values central to an ethics of rights will
have a place, but not an overriding force.
Freedom, justice, and rationality will still
be valued. The analytic, heirarchical struc-
tures that underlie relations based on
power and domination will be counter-
balanced by a concern with holistic,
democratic, integrated collective struc-
tures. Mutuality and an avoidance of
harm will be valued as highly as self-
interest.
An ethics devised with female moral
intuitions in mind will not only include
different values and re-order some of the
older ones: it will also reflect a different
methodology. The paradigm for moral
decision making will involve a "thought
experiment" that places the decision-
maker as close as possible to the interests
at stake, so that the concerns of those
affected can be genuinely felt, not merely
summoned in some abstract, remote
fashion. The traditional feminine virtue of
altruism or concern for others is to be
balanced by a respect for one's own in-
terests: responsibility to self is also ack-
nowledged as significant. We must guard
against the vice of self-sacrifice which
women traditionally have been encour-
aged to develop.
Though the ethics of care will be
developed through a recognition of
women's experience in moral decision-
making situations, it is not meant to be an
ethics solely for the use of women. It is my
belief that it is the most promising direc-
tion to pursue in developing a general
theory of ethics for all persons.
lCarol Gilligan, In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's Develop-
ment (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1982).
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